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Abstract. This paper shows, using a history based methodology, the differences between the “people’s initiative 
procedures” or “progressive model” and the “authoritative body-initiative procedures” or “plebiscitary model” – 
two structural models for recall procedure. These two heuristic models will be inferred, respectively, by the recall 
procedures adopted in the U.S., starting from 1903, and the recall procedures adopted in some States of Europe, 
starting from the Weimar constitution of 1919. The political-constitutional reasons behind the evident structural 
differences (“bottom-up” and “top-down” procedures) will be explained by providing an historical reconstruction 
about the genesis of the idea of “the recall” in the first American constitutionalism (the “Antifederalist recall”). 
Then the political idea behind the “progressive model” will be considered with special attention paid to the Swiss 
direct democracy influence on the development of the American socialists idea of the recall. The other model will 
be contextualized by focusing on the constitutional debate of the Germany around the late 19th and the early 20th 
century. The abuse of both procedures will be presented in two recent cases of tested recall procedures, California 
and Romania. Both leaded to similar results. The importance both in understanding the reference model and in 
providing detailed and strictly juridical regulations is highlighted to avoid the risk of abuses of these procedures by 
the concrete political actors.
Keywords: recall procedures, Swiss direct democracy, Abberufungsrecht, participative democracy, direct 
democracy
1. INTRODUCTION
The recent enactment of the Recall of MPs Act in the United Kingdom1 provides a good 
opportunity to revisit an old theme of the public law – the recall of the elected officials. 
The people’s power to revoke the electoral mandate of their representatives has always been 
a sensitive topic for the doctrine, because this power emphasises the relationship between 
the elected representatives and the people. Moreover, it calls into question the more 
traditional (and political) assumptions about the representative government in modern 
democracies.2 
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, one of the greatest thinkers about the concept of 
“representative democracy”, was perfectly aware of the importance of the theme and 
included the “recall of the elected representatives” as one of the three elements allowing the 
construction of a “democratic organization of the power”, presenting the recall as a means 
“to correct and to balance democratically the (…) representative power”.3
      *   PhD candidate at the University of Genova. E-mail: fra.campodonico@gmail.com
1 Recall of MPs Act 2015 of 26th of March 2015, entitled “An act to make provision about the 
recall of member of the House of Commons; and for connected purpose”, see at link 1. See Kelly, 
Coleman, Johnson (2010) 1–22 and Judge (2012) 732–51, Plotke (1997) 19–34. 
2 More on this concept see the classic volume of Leibholz (1973). See also the important 
contribution of Böckenförde (2014) 2–17. For other essays on the wide theme of democratic 
representation in modern States, e.g., Pitkin (1967) and Urbinati (2006). 
3 See Böckenförde (2014) 3.
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It is useful to investigate deeply these legal devices; understanding their working and 
to collect differences and analogies between the previous and currently existing recall 
procedures. At the end, maybe, we will be able to answer if they really are instrument 
capable “to balance democratically the representative power”. 
The well-known debate concerning the true meaning of political representation is 
historic. On one hand, there is Rousseau’s concept of direct democracy that the people 
cannot be represented, as explained in his famous book Le Contrat social from 1762, and 
on the other, there is the idea of Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, the great ideologist of the French 
revolution and writer of the famous pamphlet “Qu’est-ce que le Tiers état?”. Sieyès 
theorized the existence of the “Nation” as a specific entity that is higher and stronger than 
the individuals. The “Nation” could only be represented by the members of the National 
Assembly. Sieyès writes: “(…) les Représentans forment toute l’Assemblée Nationale; 
ils en ont tous les pouvoirs. Puisqu’ils sont les seuls (highlight in the original) dépositaires 
de la volonté générale, ils n’ont pas besoin de consulter leur Commettans sur une dissention 
qui n’existe pas”.4 Sieyès’ dogmatic view evolved within the modern concept of 
“representative government” and defeated Rousseau’s ideals of a direct-democracy by the 
people.5
However, when the first recall procedure took place in Los Angeles, in 1903, it was a 
turning point that recognized the people as the “source of sovereignty” and empowering the 
electorate with an instrument for the revocability of the public functionaries.6
Sixteen years later, in Germany, the new federal constitution (the “Weimar 
constitution”) provided another interesting procedure that allowed the “recall” of the 
Reichspräsident through a popular vote (popular referendum). According to that 
constitution, the German president, for the first time in Europe, was elected directly by the 
citizens and could also be dismissed by them.
Consequently, the first, fundamental, question is “are these two procedures linked to 
the same Rousseauian model of “direct democracy” or are they historical examples of 
completely different political ideals?”
There are important procedural differences in both cases that will have to be considered 
notwithstanding the people’s vote, a common element in both procedures. As Böckenförde 
stated, the “common will” of the people does not exist until it is summoned; the management 
of the procedure and the practical arrangements play a key role in the process of 
determination of this “common will”.7
4 See Sierès (1789) 154.
5 As already affirmed by Carl Schmitt “le plébiscite de tous le jours” is not a form of State. 
More recently, Böckenförde (2014) 3. demonstrated that the idea to realise a “direct-identity” 
democracy is both practically and theoretically impossible, because a “common will” of the people 
does not exist at all, rather set of individual wills are given. 
6 See Zimmerman (2013); Cronin (1989); Crouch (1964) 10–1.; Persily (1997) 11–41.; Mack 
(1988) 617–40. It is interesting to see how Böckenförde, despite being very sceptical about the 
theorization of a “true direct democracy”, recognizes the “recall of the representatives” as one of the 
three necessary elements (bottom-up legitimation of power, limited legal prerogatives of the 
representatives and recall) allowing a “democratic organization of the State power” (see Böckenförde 
(2014) 7.
7 “Its (of the popular will) effective development depends by someone asking: the management 
and the modalities of its concrete enforcement are determined by who asks the question and how it is 
asked, in one word: we have to interrogate it.” See Böckenförde (2014) 5. 
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These cases have an impact on modern day proceedings and these procedures have 
been tested recently, in the U.S, a famous example is the recalled California governor, Grey 
Davis, in 2003 and in Europe, in 2007 and 2012 against the Romania president, Traian 
Băsescu. Both have shown different kinds of political and juridical weakness.
Moreover, the author is convinced that the development of different models can be 
appreciated only in a strong historical and comparative perspective, looking for the genesis 
and development of different ideological justifications for recall procedures.
1.1. The value of history in a comparative research: questions of methodology
More than other juridical disciplines, comparative law needs a rigid criteria in developing 
its research, because, without a well-justified methodology could result in a mere “cherry 
picking activity” with the arbitrarily choice of objects of interest and ignoring other 
elements. Comparative activity has to find some reasons or justifications8 for the adoption 
of certain legal institutes in a given time and place or to find reasons for the phenomenon of 
“legal transplants”9 or, as it seems preferable, the “circulation of models”.10 In the 
accomplishment of this task, the comparative law can be appreciated as a “science of 
demystification” or a “school of the truth” (école de vérité).11 
Very briefly, the legal models can be understood as sets of constant elements detectable 
in different legal systems e.g., structural or procedural elements, identical or analogue 
words, terms or expressions used by the source of laws, and in different times. Obviously, 
this “circulating phenomenon” of the models has to be historically based by verifying the 
existence of coherent “legal formants” (legislative, doctrinal or jurisprudential).12 However, 
according to a recent development of the classical doctrine of legal formants, other elements 
have to be considered, such as the political and cultural ones13 i.e., the role played by 
political ideologies in the reception of one or another model. Without such a consideration 
of the political backgrounds, all comparative analysis risks being incomplete, meaningless 
or casual.14
Turning to the topic of this article, the primary focus switches on that “first recall 
procedure” (Los Angeles, 1903) rapidly duplicated by the legislation of other cities in 
California and, after a few years, by the constitutions of several States. A legal historical 
  8 For this value of comparative law see Legrand (1999) 36. Especially, where the author says: 
“the comparison (…) search to enlighten the differences between the laws and to justify the 
differences”.
  9 For this concept see the classical study of Watson (1974).
10 Quite recently, referred to this phenomenon, see Cassese (2000) 65.
11 See Monateri (2012) 7 and 22. 
12 As one of the most fundamental contributions to the comparative law studies, the doctrine of 
the “legal formants” is theorized and developed by an Italian author. See Sacco (1991) 1–2, 1–34 and 
343–401.
13 Legrand (1999) 9., refers to the “cultural context” as an unavoidable element of the 
comparative analysis. For the importance of “political data” even for the juridical studies, see the 
works of M. Weber. See also Bognetti (1994).
14 For this approach to comparative law see Bognetti (1994). 
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approach will show if and how it is possible to find a common procedural structure for all 
the numerous recall procedures adopted in the U.S. For several reasons, this common 
structure will be the “people’s initiative procedure” or “progressive model”.
Analogously, the article 43 of the Weimar constitution15 will be considered in order to 
understand the evolution of a different model for recall procedures: the “authoritative body-
initiative procedure” or “plebiscitary model”. As will be explained later in the article, the 
plebiscitary model entered in other constitutions of European countries including Austria,16 
Romania,17 Iceland,18 Slovak Republic,19 and, with some differences, in Latvia.20
1.2. Recall or recall procedure? A terminological issue
The term “recall” is vague within the U.S. context because a unique (a federal) legal 
institute called “recall” does not yet exist.21 There are, however, a multitude of different 
recall procedures, provided by the laws or by the constitutions of several states and cities of 
the U.S.22 Every procedure differs in terms of requisites for the proposition of the recall 
petitions; the respect of vacation terms; the different amounts of signatures required, the 
passive subjects of the procedure (only the elected functionary or even the appointed 
functionary?). Nevertheless, it can be seen that there are some constant structural elements, 
starting from the central role of the people, those who hold the petition initiative and the 
possibility to call for a recall election.
In the same way in the “plebiscitary model”, the people are involved in the procedure 
and they have to decide whether to confirm the President or the members of the Parliament.
Considering these analogies, it seems that the term “recall” can be used only in a 
general sense, as a synonym of “revocation by popular vote”. In this way, it refers not to the 
entire phenomenon of the revocability of public officers but only to those revoking 
procedures involving the vote of electorate.
15 For an English translation of the text of the Weimar constitution, see at link 2.
16 Art. 60, par. 6, Const. (1920, after the 1929 revision).
17 Art. 95, Const. (1991).
18 Art. 11, par. 3 and 4 Const. (1947).
19 Art. 106 Const. (1992).
20 Art. 48 and 50 Const. (1922, after the 1999 revision).
21 The Supreme Court of the U.S. did not allow recall procedures against the members of the 
Congress, declaring unconstitutional all the attempts made by the State to introduce such procedures. 
See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc.  v. Thornton. No. 93 1456. Supreme Ct. of the US. 22 May 2005. For 
an analysis of the doctrine see: Zick (1999) 572–611.
22 For a calculation of the number of the U.S. states that “authorize the recall” see Zimmerman 
(2013) 34–5.; and, for the number of the cities, see: Feeney (2007) 37–92.
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The validity of this definition appears clearer if compared with other systems for the 
revoking of public officers, such as the impeachment procedures,23 votes of confidence of 
the Parliament,24 and “trials in courts”25 against the President or the ministers of the Cabinet.
Concerning the case of impeachment, some exceptions exist despite the classical 
structure of procedure, “articles of impeachment” made by the lower chamber of Parliament 
and the right to “try all impeachments” conferred to the upper chamber.26 However, in 
general, the impeachment consists in a juridical/political procedure allowing the Parliament 
or only one chamber, to vote regarding the (political or juridical) responsibility of 
determined public functionaries and, in case, to remove them from their office. Clearly, in 
these cases, the people’s vote does not intervene until the end of the whole procedure.
In the other two scenarios, votes of confidence and juridical trials, public officers are 
judged and may be removed from their charge by the means of a parliamentary vote or, in 
the second case, by the ruling of a Court. There is no people’s intervention during all the 
revoking procedure.
 Moreover, the word “recall” can be used to indicate a specific procedure if the state’s 
legislation or constitution refers to it by name e.g., “the recall in California” meaning the 
recall procedure provided by the article 2, §13, and article 23, §1, of that Constitution.27
Nevertheless, a century ago, the term “recall” was used in common speech with an 
assumed vague meaning of a juridical/political device to remove a public officer e.g., 
a governor, a deputy, a mayor. Consequently, the term “recall” started to be intended, even 
by many authors in doctrine, as a general and unspecified legal institute, identifiable, each 
time, by referring to said events like the Recall in Oregon and the Californian Recall.28 
23 The impeachment began in England in the late fourteenth century, allowing the Parliament to 
pursue for “treason”, “felony” and “high crimes or other misdemeanours” any person, but mostly the 
king’s counsellors (or ministers). After the indipendence and with the new federal constitution, the 
impeachment procedure was receipt even in the U.S. where it is used to judge a series of (political/
juridical) crimes committed by high federal officers (included the president). On the history of 
impeachment see, ex multiis, Berger (1973) and Oliviero (2001). 
24 In the English constitutional system the lack of confidence between the Parliament and the 
Government replaced the impeachment procedures. These are now outdated. However, in many 
parliamentary and semi-presidential systems the confidence vote is a political and “easy” instrument 
to remove the PM or the ministers. For examples, in Italy, the Constitutional Court recognized (see 
ruling n. 7 of 1996) the constitutional legitimacy of a parliamentary motion of lack of confidence 
against a single minister. 
25 “Trials in courts” is used to underline the difference with the classical impeachment 
procedure, which is a completely political-managed procedure. Here reference are made to those 
cases in which the president or the ministers are judged for their crimes (common or political) by the 
courts (such as the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court or Court ad hoc) and not by the 
Parliament. For example, the Italian case where the President is impeached by the Parliament but they 
are judged by the Constitutional Court (art. 72 Const.). See analogue “trial court” procedures adopted, 
e.g., in Austria (art. 142), Germany (art. 61), and Poland (art. 145).
26 The French system is one such example but there are numerous cases. According to the 
constitution, the President of the Republic is subject to a parliamentary trial, the jury is the entire 
Parliament, with both the Assemblée Nationale and the Sénat, after a qualified majority vote by the 
two chambers separately. 
27 For a first use of the term “recall” in this specific sense see: Bird (1930).
28 See, e.g. Barnett (1915).
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2. REVISING THE ORIGIN OF THE RECALL PROCEDURES  
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2.1. The Articles of Confederation and the Antifederalists’ recall
Several scholars are used to think of recall as a legal institution deeply rooted in American 
history29. But recall only appeared in the 5th article of the Articles of Confederation 
(1777)30, allowing the member States to “recall” their delegates. Nevertheless, the Articles 
did not specify the procedure to follow and each State could independently determine the 
procedure, with an ad hoc statute or by approving an amendment to the constitution. 
Unfortunately, the States did not develop that procedure and none of the delegate was 
recalled during the few years of the American Confederation.31
However, the recall was completely absent in the new federal Constitution text of 
1789. The reason for this disappearance can be found in the political orientation of the 
recall supporters; they were antifederalist partisans32 and wanted to use this tool as a means 
of disempowerment the new Federal Congress, keeping the elected “under control” of the 
States.33 However, the Federalists stated the recall was useless because it was never used 
during the Confederation. The Anti-federalists said that it worked “without noise”; delegates 
fearing to be recalled, respected their mandate (a “sword of Damocles”). In the antifederalist 
delegates’ vision the recall provided in 1777 was successful and had to be conserved.34
A draft of the new constitution, the Virginia Plan, presented by Edmund Randolph 
proposed to introduce the “recall” against the members of the “first branch of the National 
Legislature”. However, it was rejected.35 
29 Being linked with the American direct democracy traditions. For example, Elizabeth E. Mack 
recalled the usage of the “town meetings” by the Early Americans colonials. These meetings were 
comprised of all the town men who dealt with issues by consensus. Today similar meetings are held in 
some cities of New Hampshire and Maine. It is also interesting to observe that in Europe the “town 
meetings” were born in Switzerland.
30 Article V: “For the more convenient management of the general interests of the united states, 
delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislature of each state shall direct, to 
meet in Congress on the first Monday in November, in every year, with a power reserved to each State 
to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for 
the remainder of the year”. See the original text of the Articles at link 3.
31 See on this De Franciscis (2007) 19–42.
32 Among the others, it is possible to recall here the names of Patrick Henry, Gilbert Livingston, 
John Lansig and the so called “Federal Farmer” (maybe – but there is still a debate between histo-
rians – Richard Henry Lee). See Antifederalist Paper n. 53, entitled A Plea For the Right of Recall and 
signed by Amicus (Patrick Henry). The article was published on Columbian Herald, 28 august 1788 
(now collected in Borden (1965) 47).
33 For this approach to the theme of recall see The Federal Farmer, Letter XI. January 10, 1788 
in Storing (1981) 286–9.
34 See Elliot (1827) 294.
35 Originally the project was elaborated by Alexander Hamilton. For the text see Elliot (1827) V. 
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The Antifederalists36 carried on their battle for the recall in the different States during 
the Special Conventions held for the ratification (and amendment) of the constitution.37 
All their proposals and attempts to introduce a recall procedure failed. The three famous 
authors of the Federalist Papers, Hamilton, Madison and Jay (they signed their articles as 
Publius) were fiercely adverse to the recall of elected representatives as they considered it 
as a destabilizing legal institution. They refused the “democratic government” of the people 
and worked for a “republican government”,38 in which the decisions would have to be taken 
by the elected and not the electors. Above of all, a government of the “masses” was feared 
and also the political populism, viewed “implicit”, in allowing any kind of recall procedure. 
On the other hand, they intended to protect the people from “bad representatives” by 
different constitutional means like “frequent elections”, according to the Constitution of 
1789, the House of Representatives was completely re-elected each two years. Publius also 
rebuffed the idea of recalling senators, elected for a long-term mandate – six years, because 
the Upper House had to serve as a balancing power against the populist tendencies in the 
Lower House.39
Nevertheless, one thing remained certain: the fear of the Framers of the absolute 
power. This fear was quite understandably inherited from the Pilgrim Fathers, who suffered 
political persecutions in Europe. According to several authors, both the recall and the 
impeachment were a sign of the will to maintain the elected representatives and the 
Executive inside the limits of the laws. This was limited to a few people; a chosen political 
élite (for Madison),40 and not the masses as it could lead to a “mass anarchy”.
The lack of sympathy for direct democracy, showed by many Framers, can be attributed 
with the role that Calvinistic ethic played. A doctrine stated that “(I)f the Framers were 
operating at least in part from the Protestant notion of calling, then direct democracy would 
seem problematic when it requires the individual citizen (rather than the representative) to 
become an expert on a wide range of issues. State initiatives and referenda capable of 
covering broad areas of policy are in conflict with this understanding of the role of the 
person in society.” 41
However, after the constitution was ratified, the “issue of the recall” seemed to 
disappear from the public debate in the U.S. It would be back only one hundred years late 
(but it would be completely different).
36 But not all of them. “[M]any Antifederalists” Zick explains “believed that the frailties and 
passions of ordinary men made them incapable of responsible participation in government. Still, there 
were those Antifederalists who viewed a form of explicit representative democracy as vital.” see Zick 
(1999) 572.
37 See, e.g. the Gilbert Livingston’s amendment at the New York Special Convention, as 
reported in Borden (1965) 152.
38 As very well said, more recently, by Merci Hamilton: “The republicanism crafted by the 
Framers works in significant part because each entity – individual citizens, the people as a whole, 
representatives, branches of the government, and the state and federal governments – is checked in 
some meaningful way to steer it away from tyranny and toward the common good.” See Hamilton 
(2004) 411–56.
39 See the Federalist papers n. 57 and 63, they are available even on line at link 4. 
40 He wrote in the Federalist n. 10 the public views would be “refine[d] and enlarge[d]” by 
“passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens”. Hamilton recommended that “the 
national legislature should be composed only of landholders, merchants, and men of the learned 
professions.” the Federalist No. 35. See more on Zick (1999) 572.
41 Hamilton (2004).
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2.2.  The amendment to the City Charter of Los Angeles in 1903  
and the political backgrounds. 
According to recent studies,42 the debate around the introduction of recall procedures re-
started at the end of XIX century and many American scholars of that period proved to be 
interested in.43 Finally, in 1903, the first recall procedure was introduced in the City Charter 
of Los Angeles44, following the amendment-process started three years before.45 For the 
first time in the U.S. history, this new procedure allowed the electors to remove “any 
incumbent of an elective office, whether elected by vote of the people or appointed to fill a 
vacancy”. Shortly, a petition signed by the 20% of the “entire vote cast for all candidates 
for the office, the incumbent of which is sought to be removed” was required to start the 
recall procedure. A “recall election” was supposed to be held in short time after fixed 
amount of signatures was reached and the people would have to choose if they want to 
conserve the officer or wanted change.
In 1908, Oregon was the first state to adopt a recall procedure in its constitution.46 
After that the recall procedures diffused widely across the U.S. and, now, there are sixteen 
states providing with this legal instrument in their constitutions.47 Today the amount of the 
“objective”48 and “subjective requisites” 49 for the proposition of a recall petition differs 
from state to state and city to city.
With respect to the “objective requisites”, it is possible to distinguish between states 
(and cities) in which the petitions have to specify the juridical reasons for the recall of an 
elected officer (called “judicial process”)50 and others in which it is not required. In these 
latter cases, a general declaration of “lack of confidence” of the electorate against the 
officers subjected to the procedure is generally sufficient (“political process”).51
In some cases, a maximum term has to be respected for the collection of the signatures 
or, a limit date for the circulation of the petitions or modules.52 In several cases it is also 
42 See Ronchi (2009) 99–129; Bird, Ryan (1930) 32ss.
43 A first example in Sullivan (1892) 39. Here the Author quotes also the usage of the 
Abberufungsrecht in Switzerland.
44 See the text of the “section 198-p” of the City Charter (see at link 5). On this amendment see 
also: Shaffner (1915) 37; Phelps (1915) 1; Munro (1912) 42; Crouch (1964) 10.
45 The Board of Freeholders (composed by fifteen members and chaired by the progressive 
leader John R. Haynes) was the special commission charged to do the reviews and it held its first 
meeting the 17 july 1900. On this Bird, Ryan (1930) 32.
46 Article 2, Section 18, of the Oregon constitution. See Barnett (1915) 189 and Feeney (2007) 
40.
47 The state constitutions that allow a recall procedure are: Alaska (art. 11, §8), Arizona (art. 8, 
§§1–6), California (art. 2, §13 e art. 23, §1), Colorado (art. 21, §1), Idaho (art. 6, §6), Kansas (art. 4, 
§§3–5), Louisiana (art. 10, §26), Michigan (art. 2, §8), Minnesota (art. VIII, §6), Nevada (art. 2, §9), 
New Jersey [art. 1, §2(b)], New Mexico (art. 10, §1), North Dakota (art. 3, §§1 e 10), Oregon (art. 2, 
§18), Washington (art. 1, §§33–34), Winsconsin (art. 13, §12).
48 E.g., the format for the circulation of the recall petitions, the number of the signatures 
required, and the structural or functional quorum for the recall elections.
49 See supra at II, section 2.
50 The States requiring “specific grounds” for the presentation of a recall petition are: Alaska, 
Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Rhode Island, Virginia e Washington. See Zimmerman (2013) 
15.
51 On this see Zimmerman (2013) 43.
52 The term is variable: from the 180 days of Louisiana to the 60 days of Colorado.
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mandatory to consider a vacation term from the beginning or the end of the mandate of the 
public officer. Differences exist in the number of signatures required to support the 
petitions.53 
Indeed, the recall elections of public functionaries can be distinguished by the 
modalities in which the substitution of the officer concerned can happen by:
a) a simple vote to revoke the mandate of an elected54
b) a double vote, one removing the subject and the other choosing the substitute55
c) an open campaign, similar to an English by-election in which all the subjects, 
including the recalled officer can participate.56 
However, there are important fixed elements or structural constants between these 
procedures. All of them preview the instrument of petitions as the only way to start the 
procedure. These petitions have to be signed by a certain number of registered electors of 
the state or city. There is no means in which the legislative or executive powers could 
interfere with these procedures or stop them. A complete inversion in the procedural 
structure never happens – no constitution or city charter can confer the recall initiative to a 
different organ of the state as an “authoritative body” e.g., the parliament of the state or 
the government.57 In all cases, the electorate remains the starting point of the entire 
procedure.
However, this is extremely interesting because it is narrowly linked with the political/
ideological background of the first U.S. recall procedures and it is interesting to see who 
supported/fought for the introduction of recall procedure in the U.S. legal system. 
There were the Socialist Parties of America, initially the Social Democratic Party of 
America and, then the Socialist Party of America,58 whose members are mainly of German 
origins (an important point for later consideration). These two left parties proposed the 
introduction of the “binding mandate” for all public officers together with the referendum 
and popular initiative59 then accepted usages of “recall” following the “American style” or 
as a means to increase their political propaganda.
On the other hand, there were the “Progressive movements”, a populist movement that 
developed in the first years of the 20th century, the “Progressive Era”.60 Their anti-
53 There are four criteria of classification, see The Book of States 1996–7. Lexington, 1997, 
221–2.
54 See art. X (26) of the Louisiana constitution.
55 As happened in California, when the governor Gray Davis was recalled in 2003.
56 See art. VIII/I (4) of the Arizona constitution. More recently, this solution is adopted by the 
U.K. in the Recall of MPs Act of 2015.
57 For a structural difference between «full recall» and «mixed recall» procedures, see the 
chapter 5 of Direct Democracy: The International IDEA Handbook 2008, International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), available at link 6.
58 See the Platform of the Social Democratic Party of America adopted in Chicago, June 21, 
1897, now collected in Heath (1900). At the point 8 of the Platform the socialist leaders have already 
made a claim for “(t)he adoption of the Initiative and the Referendum, the Imperative Mandate and 
Proportional Representation”. Few years later, in 1901, the Socialist Party of America was the first 
Party to introduce in its Manifesto an explicit reference to “the recall”, see the text of the Political 
Manifesto in Social Democratic Herald, v. 4, no. 7, Milwaukee, 1901, n. 159, 2–3.
59 It seems noteworthy the fact that the first referendum and initiative procedures were 
introduced in South Dakota in 1898, see Persily (1997) 16.
60 Mack (1988) 621. In general, on the “Progressive movement” see: Holligsworth (1912) 
32–48.
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establishment propaganda became strong in California, due to the political scandals 
involving the economic relations of the two traditional parties with a powerful private 
company, the Southern Pacific Railroad.61 Here, John R. Haynes,62 chief of the “Direct 
Legislation League” of California, successfully led the battle for the introduction of the 
“plebiscitary trinity” (referendum, initiative and recall) and found more popular consensus. 
Haynes saw the liberation from the railroad trusts in the direct democracy “which dominated 
the State politics” and, the possibility to realize the “government of, by and for the 
people”.63 
Through massive propaganda in local newspapers64 and heavy rhetorical and 
demagogic speeches, like “How best can we arm the People to protect themselves 
hereafter?”, Haynes reached the chair of the Board of Freeholders and was charged to make 
the amendments to the City Charter. The State Senate stopped the first attempt but these 
amendments were after ratified by the popular vote, following a special referendum process, 
introduced in 1902.
At this point, it seems quite clear that the political ideology driving the first introduction 
of recall in the “modern” U.S. was completely opposite from the old “Antifederalist recall”.
2.3. Looking for the origin of the socialist idea of the recall of public officers
The socialists also have fought for the recall, as a means to introduce the “binding mandate” 
in America. However, they did not share the same “populist trends” of the Progressives but 
fought for a device they believed would be the end of the bourgeois government. In order to 
understand the gravitas of this point, a brief review of the socialist thought about the specific 
point of the “binding mandate” is required. This was opportunely translated, for an 
American “audience”, as “recall”.
In 1762, Jan-Jacques Rousseau theorized the existence of a people-assembled power to 
recall all public officers. It is a possibility that these theories were derived from the medieval 
experiences of direct democracy in the medieval cities of Switzerland,65 where the quite 
61 More details in Persily (1997) 53. See also Garrett (2004) 240: “California adopted a 
statewide recall procedure in 1911 as part of an effort by John R. Haynes and other progressives to 
implement a system in which corrupt officials at both the local and state levels, particularly those 
beholden to the mighty Southern Pacific Railroad, could be removed before a regularly scheduled 
election.”
62 See Sitton (1988) 2–17. See also the contributions of Robert La Follette (e.g., see his 
intervention, entitled “Initiative, Referendum and Recall,” in The Progressive, December 10, 1910). 
63 Persily (1997) 29: “In California, the legislature was controlled by the Southern Pacific 
Railroad and the Knights of the Royal Arch (brewers and distillers).”
64 “Aided by writers from the Los Angeles Express, one of the few newspapers not dominated 
by the railroads, the Progressives, through an organization they named the Lincoln-Roosevelt League, 
launched a methodical campaign both in the press and in the courtroom to expose corruption inherent 
in every railroad-dominated city government.” Persily (1997) 29.
65 About the sources of inspiration of Rousseau’s idea of direct democracy there is a huge 
debate. However, important French authors have made some hypotheses about the Swiss medieval 
experience of the “town meetings.” See on this Esmein (1896) 255; Duguit (1923) 475; and Burdeau 
(1932) 388.
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obscure system of “Landesgemeinde”, a form of town meeting, allowed direct popular 
decisions in many fields.66 
There is a large volume literature concerning the direct democracy constitutional 
devices provided by the cantonal constitutions in Switzerland67 and, for many aspects, the 
Abberufungsrecht (literally: “right to recall”) is relevant.68 Following the Act of Mediation 
of 1803,69 this institute was introduced in seven constitutions and since then has been 
conserved until today.70 In the majority of these cases, the procedure still presents a first 
phase, in which the electors can collect the signatures required for the petition, and a second 
phase in which the people can vote on the revoke. The peculiar feature is it can be used 
only against the entire organ (entire cabinet or the entire legislative assembly according to 
the cantonal provision) – the electors cannot vote for removing only one member of those 
institutions.
The Abberufungsrecht has been defined a dormant institution, due to the limited use of 
the procedure.71 However, it is noteworthy that the U.S. doctrine, at the end of the 19th 
century, was already studying these procedures at least, together with the Swiss referendum 
and initiative.72
The Swiss recall, however, was quite successful in Central Europe and according to 
Robert H. Wells,73 the Swiss precedent was source of inspiration for the recall procedures 
adopted in many cities and Länder in Germany, starting from the half of 19th century. Here, 
the Volksbegehren (popular petition) and the Volksentscheid (popular deliberation) 
represented and still represent the two main phases of the recall procedures provided by the 
constitutions of six Länder.74 Even in these cases, the people could collect the required 
66 Some information (in English) about these ancient institution (“old folk-mote”) are given by 
Dubuois, Fleeney (1998) 256–7. An historical reconstruction was offered, at the end of XIX century, 
by Vincent (1891). According to Vincent view: “This was a meeting of the inhabitants of Schwyz, for 
the purpose of making regulations for the sale of their common lands and for taxation” (ivi, 107). 
Today, Landesgemeinde still happen in two Swiss Cantons: Glarus and Appenzell Innerhoden.
67 For an historical approach to the theme of referendum see Aubert (1974) 3–16. 
68 For a recent and analytical essay (available in English) on the recall in Switzerland see 
Serdült, link 7. The A. explains the Swiss recall is considered a “measure of last resort”, otherwise, in 
“normal” cases, the criminal courts intervene to sanction corruption or other scandals involving the 
elected officers. See also Church (2004) 141–6. En French language, instead, see Giraux (2013) at 
link 8.
69 Thought this Act Napoleon concluded the brief experience of the Helvetic Republic (1798–
1803).
70 The Helvetic Republic was a unitary state, which comprehended 13 cantons of the previous 
Switzerland Confederation. The constituent assembly of Aarau promulgated its constitution the 12th 
April 1798. The Cantons adopting the Abberufungrecht disposition in their statute were: Basel-Stadt, 
Bern, Fribourg, Zürich, Luzern, Schaffhausen and Solothurn. See on this Olivetti (2001) 355–78.
71 See Serdült link 7, 8. The only successful recall procedure in Switzerland took place in 
 Aargau in XIX century. Moreover, after that, the Aargau recall procedure was abolished. As showed 
by a graph in the quoted article, Ticino still has the most attempts.
72 As proved by the amount of studies existing, e.g. Hazeltine (1907) 202–13; Rappart (1912) 
110–45; Munro (1912) 4; Johnson (1912) 139–64. 
73 Who studied the system of the German referenda. See Wells (1929) 29–36.
74 Baden-Württenberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Rhineland-Palatinate. For 
further details see, e.g. Gunlicks (1998) 105–25. 
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signatures and call for a popular referendum for the dissolution (revoke) of the entire 
legislative council or the parliament of the Land.
To show the Swiss influence on the German procedures, Wells recalls the influence of 
the contributions of two socialist writers, Moritz Rittinghausen and Victor Considérant.75 
Considérant was influenced by Rittinghausen but they elaborated a concept of direct 
legislation by the people, “law making by means of referendum and popular initiative”,76 
as the only juridical device allowing the subversion of the bourgeois and oppressing state. 
Recalling Rousseau’s most important assumption, Considérant wrote that “If the people 
delegates its sovereignty, it abdicates it”. To avoid this bad outcome the people have to 
govern directly. How they can do it in certain terms? Here the clearest link between the 
direct legislation of the people and the recall procedure against the public officers can be 
found.
“The People vote on the principle of the laws. The votes are counted in each local 
section (…) and the real and direct collective will of the People or of the majority is 
manifest. There is now a law. It only remains to draft it. That is done by the minister 
appointed by the People, who will conform to the will of the people for several reasons: 
first because a minister naturally obeys the Sovereign on whom he depends. Second, 
because if the Sovereign were dissatisfied with its minister, it would dismiss him instantly. 
(…)”.77 It is also noteworthy that Considérant spent a few years in Texas, where he 
unsuccessfully tried to carry on a project of Fourier’s Phalanstère, a sort of workers 
commune based on direct democracy, and where he probably tried to share his ideas with 
the raising socialists forces. 
In the following years, all these assumptions about the evolvement of the people in 
legislation became definite part of the first socialist party manifests78 and even in the famous 
Gotha program (1875) this statement can be found “The Socialist Labor Party of Germany 
demands as the foundation of the state: (…) 2. Direct legislation by the people”.79 Karl 
Marx explicitly referred to the “right of recall of all public officers” in La guerre civile en 
France (1871), praising the Paris Commune experience.80 He understood the “binding 
mandate” for all elected and unelected public officers as a legal means aiming to dismantle 
completely the government, which he had defined as “a committee for managing the 
common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie”.81
Moreover, according to a Swiss scholar, Uwe Serdült, who has explored the theme, 
“it seems that John R. Haynes got the idea by reading a famous book of Parsons”.82 In this 
book this Author showed how to realize his political ideals of direct democracy, well-
summarized in a rhetoric question of the introduction, “Shall the people own the city and its 
75 Rittinghausen (1850); Considérant (1851).
76 See on this Bullock (1987) 62–81.
77 Considérant (1851) 19–20.
78 See Ensor (1910) 319–58.
79 For an English translation see Hamerow (1973) 230–2.
80 See the “Appel aux électores” of 22 March 1871 at link 9. In this Appel the Central Committee 
of the National Guard declared that: “The Member of the municipal assembly, shall be controlled, 
surveyed, and subjected to the public opinion; they are revocable, accountable, and responsible.”
81 See the text of the Manifesto of the Communist Party at link 10.
82 See Serdült at link 7, 2. The book’s reference is Parson (1901).
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government or shall they be owned by the politicians and monopolists?” and to contrast the 
distortions of the representative system.83
However, it is proved that, following the socialist “European” teachings, the American 
socialist leaders (like Alfred Berger or Eugene V. Debs) started to include “the referendum, 
the initiative and the recall” in their speeches between the late 19th and early 20th century 
and, the “plebiscitary trinity” in their political propaganda.84 
The political fights for the (re)introduction of the “recall” in the U.S. public and 
scientific debate, however, brought with them a definitional/terminological “chaos”. The old 
antifederalist concept of recall was no more applicable to the “modern” procedures and 
these developed so quickly and in so many different ways that it became impossible for the 
scholars to manage for a unifying definition.
2.4. The “difficult” definition of “the recall” in the 20th century U.S. doctrine 
The fast development combined with a wide diffusion of the “recall” in the U.S. resulted in 
scholars trying to define the phenomenon. In one of the first essays on the theme Delos F. 
Wilcox said that recall was “a guaranteed right of the people to discharge their public 
servants when these public servants cease to be satisfactory to them”,85 but for many other 
authors it was “only” a “legal provision for the retirement of a public officer before his term 
of office expires, if he has forfeited the confidence of the voters”.86
The analysis of these definitions87 lead to the “recall phenomenon” by the first 
American doctrine, in the 19th Century, led to three critical questions:
1) Is the recall a right or a legal procedure?
2) Who are these “public servants” or “public officers”?
3) What means “cease to be satisfactory” to the people or “he has forfeited the 
confidence” of the voters?
The unclear definitions offered by the first doctrine generated not only terminological 
but also conceptual problems. For example, was the revocability of an appointed and thus 
non–elected official, implied in the concept of recall?88 Did the voters have to allege the 
motivations or the facts at the basis of their request for a “recall election” in their petitions?
An answer to these ambiguities can be found in the fact that they reflect the existing 
differences between different recall procedures.89 The great diffusion of this legal 
instrument, did not allow the perpetuation of a procedural homogeneity. In this process of 
83 “The problem is to keep the advantages of the representative system (…) and eliminate its 
evil, haste, complexity, corruption errors (…). The solution lies in a representative system guarded by 
constitutional provisions for popular initiative, adoption, veto and recall.” See Parson (1901) 256.
84 More details in Testi (1980). See, e.g., the Berger’s articles on the Social Democratic Herald, 
in 1902 quoted in Testi (1980) 137.
85 Wilcox (1912) 169.
86 See Shaffner (1915) 37.
87 See also the definition given by the National Municipal League, as reported in Farmer (1912) 
60.
88 An interesting and controversial case was about the introduction of the recall of judicial 
decisions. Important politicians, such as Theodore Roosevelt, supported this introduction. See Stagner 
(1980) 257–72.
89 Even today, some procedures admit petitions for the recall of the members of the judicial 
power (as in several cities of Wisconsin). Other procedures, instead, allow petitions only for the 
elected officials in different branches (legislative or executive). See on this Zimmerman (2013) 90.
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expansion the “original model” received modifications, adaptations and extensions or it was 
subjected to different interpretations, mostly given by the state courts. 
More recently, some American scholars (Thomas Cronin and Joseph Zimmerman) 
noticed these definitional inadequacies to the complexity of the “recall phenomenon” and 
started to change their attitude toward the problem. For example, Thomas Cronin, around 
the end of the 1980s, presented the “recall” as “the procedural democracy device that allows 
voters to discharge and replace a public official”,90 so the “recall” was no longer “a right” 
but became a “procedural democracy device”.91
The definition proposed by Joseph Zimmerman confirmed Cronin’s conclusion and 
added “The recall is a participatory device allowing voters by means of petitions to place 
the question of removing an elected officer on the ballot before the expiration of the term of 
office, thereby recognizing the electorate as the fountainhead of the sovereign power”.92 
Even if this last definition of “recall” is not completely satisfying because it does not 
consider, for example, the case of unelected officers, nevertheless it underlines, for the first 
time, a very important element – the people as the “fountainhead of the sovereignty”. This 
is the most important contribution given to the quest for a common structure between the 
U.S. recall procedures.
2.5.  From the past to the present: the “economical manipulation”  
of a recall procedure in the last “Californian case”
In 2003, a recall petition against the governor Gray Davis was signed by the 12% of those 
who voted at the last gubernatorial elections (897,158)93 as required by the Art. II, §14(b) of 
the California Constitution, after thirty-one attempts to qualify a gubernatorial recall for the 
California ballot including a first attempt against Gray Davis.94 First, it is important to 
consider the California rules concerning the impeachment procedure allow the recall 
election be held together with the new election for governor. For this reason, many 
candidates ambitious to get the place, including also Arnold Schwarzenegger, decided to 
support that recall petition. As reported by scholars, the recall forces were helped in 
collecting all the required signatures by a substantial amount of money from private 
financers, especially from the Republican Darrell Issa who paid 2 million dollars to finance 
the recall promoters. 
The key element for a winning petition circulation it is the possibility to have paid 
circulators. Since 1988, when the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional the state 
laws banning paid circulators,95 these types of circulators have been allowed anywhere. 
In the last California case, the huge amount of money (2 million dollars) spent by rich but 
not uninterested private individuals led to a collection of 1.36 million signatures. Moreover, 
in California a strong, professionalized initiative industry of consultants, including 
90 See Cronin (1989) 125.
91 However, the jurisprudence remains not unanimous. E.g., in 1915, in one of the first cases the 
California Court of Appeals stated the recall was not properly a right of the people but a procedure 
that could be construed liberally and not limited to the cases of violations of laws. More lately, in 
1983, the Colorado Supreme Court declared the recall to be “a fundamental constitutional right.”
92 See Zimmerman (2013) 12.
93 See all these data in Garrett (2004) 240.
94 See Garrett (2004) 240; for more details about the previous attempts see also: Bowler, Cain 
(2004) 7–9. On the Gray Davis’ recall also Miller (2005) 135–62.
95 See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
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companies “that offer clients a money-back guarantee if they do not produce enough valid 
signatures to qualify something for the ballot; in return, they are paid about $1.50 per 
signature”96 has developed.
According to several scholars, all these elements are a clear distortion of that 
“progressive idea” of the recall drafters, where the more or less large amount of signatures 
required was a sign of the popular support for the request. This requirement should serve to 
guarantee both the elected officers and the electors: The officer should not have to fear a 
request for recall election if it is not shared by many people and the electors that they 
conserve power on these procedure and it cannot proceed with a their quite large consensus. 
Moreover, the drafters of this procedure were thinking to common work of all volunteers 
and surely cannot image the intervention of professionals.
Elisabeth Garrett correctly observed that the introduction of a paid system for the 
collection of signature “strengthens the hand of those who can afford to spend substantial 
money on a petition drive.” Allowing rich and interested citizens to pay for a successful 
procedure when they know it is the right moment e.g. according to the polls a scandal, 
a political mistake, in the case of political weakness of the target-officer, as in the Gray 
Davis case.
However, after the verification of the achievement of the required signatures, the date 
of the recall election (and of the contextual eventual election of the new governor) was 
fixed. The most famous Republican candidate to the “replacement” of Davis, Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, spent over 10.5 million dollars of his own money on his campaign. 
Clearly, the financing problems connected with an electoral campaign are always a sensitive 
topic in the U.S., but, in the California case of 2003, they mixed with the recall procedure 
due to the fact that the California recall elections are held together with the eventual and 
consequent election of the new officer. The interesting point is that while the other 
candidates at the eventual substitution of Davis were bound to maximum contributions of 
21,200 dollars from each individual, the candidates supported by the committee pro or 
against the recall did not suffer the same limitations. Actually, the contributions to the recall 
campaign are not bounded to a certain amount. For example, Davis collected 18.3 million 
dollars for his committee “Californians Against the Costly Recall of the Governor”, “a sum 
made possible by the absence of contribution limitations”.97 Schwarzenegger also used 
“separate pro-recall committees” to support the campaign for the recall but no one could 
avoid that this separate committees used the same slogans and images used by the official 
committee for Schwarzenegger as a candidate he was subjected as the other to the bound of 
money contribution so, indirectly, supporting his candidature.98
96 Garrett (2004) 241.
97 Garrett (2004) 250.
98 “Unless a viewer noticed the fine print identifying the sponsor of the ad, she would be hard-
pressed to tell the difference between one funded by the Schwarzenegger campaign committee and 
one paid for by the “Total Recall” committee.”
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3. A DIFFERENT MODEL?  
THE PRESIDENTIAL RECALL IN THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTION:  
GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT
3.1.  The article 43, section 2, of the German Constitution of 1919  
and its homologues in Europe
After the end of the First World War and the abdication of the Kaiser Willem II, Hugo 
Preuß, a Berliner jurist of Jewish origins, was charged by Friedrich Ebert, the interim 
president of the Reich, to prepare the draft of the new constitution of the first German 
republic.99 For the form of government of the “New” Germany, he proposed an interesting 
mechanism which partially anticipated the French constitution of the Fifth Republic with a 
President directly elected by the people, a powerful Government and a strong Parliament, 
at least the Reichstag, the elective Chamber of the Parliament.100
As well as a “semi-presidential regime”, Preuß prepared a complex system of checks 
and balances, in which the “recall procedure” of the article 43, section 2, can be enumerate 
as a balance device, equilibrating the wide powers given to the President. That article 
established the possibility for the Reichstag to call for a “recall election” against the 
President. It previewed that if the electors confirm the President, the Reichstag would be 
considered immediately dismissed and new elections called. In addition, in this case, the 
President would be considered automatically re-elected for a new mandate.101 The article, 
however, did not specify any juridical reasons allowing the Parliament to call for a “popular 
recall” (Volksabstimmung). Consequently, the Reichstag would have the power to call for it 
for both political and juridical responsibilities of the President. The electors, instead, had no 
legal means to propose autonomously the recall vote against the President as collection of 
signatures was not allowed by the Constitution.102 
Today, similar constitutional provisions are relatively widespread in Europe. The 
Austrian Constitution of 1920, emended in 1929, allows a popular vote to recall the 
President, as well the Icelandic Constitution of 1945, the Romanian Constitution of 1991, 
and the Slovak Constitution of 1992, are all inspired by the first Weimar procedure. Only 
the Parliaments can trigger the procedures, through a majority vote (qualified or not, 
according to the case), the electors, instead, are not allowed collect the signatures to call the 
recall election against the president. The Latvian procedure is also similar. There, actually, 
the President has the power to pose the question at the electors whether they want to recall 
  99 In general, for the historical experience of the Weimar Republic see Jacobson and Schlink 
(2009).
100 About the form of government choosed by Preuß, see Caldwel (1997). 
101 This was the text of the article: “The term of office of the Reich President lasts seven years. 
Re-election is permitted. The Reich President can be deposed by plebiscite, which has to be suggested 
by the Reichstag. This Reichstag decision requires a majority of two thirds of the votes. Such a 
decision bars the Reich President from continued exercise of his office. A rejection of the deposition 
is regarded as a re-election and results in the dissolution of the Reichstag. The Reichspräsident cannot 
be persecuted in a penal matter without the approval of Reichstag.” (see an English translation of the 
Weimar constitution in McBain (1922). 
102 George Burdeau identified the greater danger of this procedure in the “substantial passivity” 
of the electorate. See Burdeau (1932) 339.
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the Parliament, as Latvia is a unicameral system and, if they want to conserve the 
Parliament, the President is automatically dismissed.103
3.2. The constitutional role of the people in the authoritative-body initiative model
Preuß’s work was partially inspired by the book of Robert Redslob Die parlamentarische 
Regierung in ihrer wahren und in ihrer unechten Form of 1918104 In which Redslob 
explained his theory about the “true” parliamentary form of Government, in which the 
balance between the different powers of the State has to be preserved.
According to Redslob’s ideal, the President and the people should be the guardians of 
the balance, although in very different ways. In fact, the first organ as a permanent one has 
to mediate continually between the executive power and the parliament. The second organ, 
instead, is summoned only to solve, by the means of the general elections or the referenda, 
the controversies that the President failed to fix. 
Starting from Redslob’s thoughts, Preuß arrived at the conclusion that the electorate is 
not the sole owner of the sovereign power in the modern state, but it is “only” an organ like 
the others, like the President, Parliament and Cabinet.105 In Preuß’s vision the people are 
not more powerful than other authoritative constitutional bodies but they are the last judges 
of the controversies that could happen between them.106 Moreover, Preuß was a fervent 
anti-socialist and an inflexible critic of Rousseau’s theory of volonté générale, which he 
saw at the origin of the French Terror and the despotism of Robespierre. For these reasons 
he would never accept the idea to pose the masses of proletariat as the top of the new 
German Republic.107
Indeed, the people’s role in founding the constitution was a main topic for all the 
Weimar constitutional debate. Peter Caldwell summarized that “on the one hand the people 
allegedly produced all state power. But on the other hand, the production of law took place 
only through legal procedures. Who was sovereign, the constitutional people or the 
democratic constitution?”108
In many respects, the German constitutional tradition was neither progressive nor 
oriented towards the western liberalism with all the guaranteed rights of the individuals 
e.g., the Constitution of 1871 lacked of a bill of rights. Actually, the German constitutionalism 
was influenced by a conservative legal tradition, deeply rooted in Carl Friedrich von 
Gerber’s thought that the individual rights did not exist in nature but only as a part of a 
103 See articles 48 and 50 (Const. 1922). These articles provide a very complex mechanism 
through which the President can propose to the electorate the dissolution of the Sejma (the Latvian 
Parliament). If the people in their majority oppose the dissolution the President is considered dis-
missed from office. The first author to study this peculiar procedure of Latvia was the naturalized 
French jurist Mirkine-Guetzévitch. See Mirkine-Guetzévitch (1931) 304–20. More recently see Bal-
din (2012) 1–16.
104 Of this book, Robert Redslob made a second edition, in France, in 1924, in which he 
analysed and criticized also the Weimar constitution. The second edition was Redslob (1924). On this 
book see Lanchester (2009) 15.
105 See an explanation of its concept of Gebietkörperschaften (collective person) in Mezzadra 
(1999).
106 About Preuss’s thought see Mezzadra (1999).
107 On this anti-socialist attitude of Preuss see Stirk (2002) 504.
108 Caldwel (1997) 23.
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“closed, positive legal system”.109 The positive tradition, as theorized and systematized by 
Paul Laband110, contributed at the strengthening of the authoritarian and elitist trends settled 
in by the Bismarck’s military politics of German unification. The strong “monarchical-
principle based constitution of 1871” 111 was also a way to solve the biggest problem of the 
famous Prussian general – How to keep together a huge set of different states (the “new” 
Länder) that have been historically, culturally, religiously, and politically divided? 
The idea of a differentiated people and of polytheism of different values (pluralistic 
society) entered in the debate through Hans Kelsen’s thought. For him, the people were not 
“a set, a mass, so to speak, but only a system of individual acts, determined by the juridical 
system of the state”, they are “objects of power” and not “subjects”. Actually, they “play a 
role as subject of power only when they took part at the creation of the state order”.112 
There is “a people” car we have a certain number of different individuals subjected to the 
same juridical system (the state), regardless of their feelings. There are always different 
interests in the people and the majority took the place of the entire electorate and, in some 
way, “summarize it”.113 At the end, the modern democracies have to be necessarily indirect 
and “mediated” by the role of the parliament – it is the place of the political compromise.
Kelsen’s vision states that the intervention of the political parties will be determinant.114 
This was also the point of the “corporative” jurists.115 The doctrine of “state organism” 
(or corporatism) was started by George Jellinek and further developed by Otto von Gierke116 
(who was also Preuß’s mentor). This last author denied the atomistic vision of a nation 
composed by individuals, solemnly proclaimed by the French and American Revolutions 
and instead, sponsored a society (a Nation) formed by groups, as collective bodies with 
specific needs and beliefs. 117 The political parties, churches, associations, trade unions, and 
also the parliament, ministers and the king, collected together give the “only” complete 
image of the State. The State was not something of detached by the single pieces of its body 
(Gebietkörperschaften) – it was each of them and none could own it. The State as a whole, 
made by different parties (“the people” between them), in which each part of the body has 
its own function.
So, what are the functions of the people? Preuß was personally persuaded of a political 
need for the “new” Germany; the implementation of the participation of the people in the 
public life.118 In educating them at political decisions and in searching to avoid a process of 
109 Caldwel (1997) 46.
110 Nevertheless, in his famous speech at the University of Dresden (1896) he did not solve the 
question about the origin of the constitution but limited himself in describing the necessary 
cooperation between the king and the popular assembly.
111 On this definition see Lanchester (2008) 24.
112 More on his concept of the people see Kelsen (1929).
113 Here Kelsen was inspired by a previous work of Koigen (1912) 142. For this last Author: 
“The people is composed of the expression of the will of the many. When the many come together in 
legal, regulated relationship and administer justice, the majority of their wills becomes a people’s 
will.”
114 “The democracy exist only if the individuals collect themselves according to their political 
affinities, aiming to orient the general will towards their political scopes (…).” See Kelsen (1929) 63.
115 See Schmitt (2001) 87.
116 See von Gierke (1887).
117 For an organic vision of the national society see Leibholz (1933).
118 Preuß (1915).
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expulsion of the “society” from the political life of the country, Preuß wanted to preserve a 
people’s role in the constitutional balance.119 
Consequently, Preuß proposed to the Weimar National Assembly the creation of 
several constitutional devices for participative democracy (popular referendum and 
initiative).120 Article 43, section 2, of the Constitution was a clear example of this aim with 
the people have to decide on a conflict between the Parliament (Reichstag) and the President 
and having to resolve it or by dissolving the Parliament and re-electing the President, or 
opting for the recall of the President. 
3.3. The “plebiscitary” model and the Romania cases
A common structure exists between the Weimar precedent and the other European 
procedures. The procedural structure can be summarized as follows: authoritative-body 
initiative (generally by the Parliament), vote, recall of the elected officer. 
Clearly, the common element is that the people have to follow the initiative of a 
different power of the State, eventually solving a conflict between other powers. In this 
sense, it does not seem inapropriate to indicate them as a “plebiscitary” model. According 
to one definition, the plebiscite is “a vote to confirm a decision which has already been 
taken: in case of a yes vote, the decision is maintained; in case of a no vote, the decision 
should be called off and the process may be re-launched”.121
Even this model can lead to abuses and this will be demonstrated by the two Romania 
cases (2007 and 2012) involving the president Traian Băsescu. He was twice subjected to 
the procedure of “presidential recall” provided by the art. 95 of the Romania Constitution of 
1991.122 
This last article differs from the Weimar precedent and does not require a qualified 
parliamentary majority i.e., two-thirds of the members, to approve the call for a recall 
election against the President and a simple majority is sufficient to suspend the president 
from his/her functions and to call for the popular vote. Moreover, Parliament is not 
automatically dissolved even if the people do not recall the President, and the presidential 
powers to dissolve the Parliament are very limited according to the Romania constitution.123 
Finally, the procedure also provides an opportunity for Constitutional Court has to give its 
previous advice on the fairness of the accusation expressed against the President.124
119 Preuß was not the only sceptical German jurist towards the people’s vote, even Hans Kelsen 
clearly rejected the idea of a generically rightness of the popular intervention through the referenda or 
plebiscites. For him the people is not “a set, a mass, so to speak, but only a system of individual acts, 
determined by the juridical system of the State”. More on his concept of the people see Kelsen (1929). 
120 A punctual analysis of the different direct democratic devices provided by the Weimar 
constitution in Thoma (1928) 55–73.
121 E.g., Mentan (2010) at link 11.
122 The president is elected directly by the people and many authors consider the Romania form 
of government as a semi-presidential one. Ex multiis, see Lime (1994) 353–77, Mcgregor (1994) 13–
30, and Popa (2004) 131–8. On the other hand, Vasiliescu (1995) 453 speaks about the Romania form 
of government as a “rationalized parliamentary” one. 
123 The Romania President can only dissolve the Parliament in certain cases i.e. if the Parliament 
refused for two times the confidence vote to the Government (art. 89 Const.) Moreover the President 
can use this power only one time per year and not during the last 6 months of their mandate. 
124 About the role of the Constitutional Court in Romania, see Doldur (2008), Muraru (1995) 
11–32, Bartole (1996) 229–42. 
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After winning the presidential election of 2004, Train Băsescu lost a large percentage 
of his political majority in Parliament due to a political rupture with the leader and Prime 
Minister of the main allied party, Călin Popescu Tăriceanu. Following the parliamentary 
accusation of “high violations of the constitution”, the President was suspended from office 
by an absolute majority (322 against 108) of the Parliament in a common session (the 
Senate and the House of Representatives sitting together for a total of 588 members). 
The Constitutional Court had already stated in its advice, that the behaviour of the President 
could constitute “high violations of the constitutions”. However, they were too vague and 
only politically relevant and the parliamentary accusations were only a pretext for a recall 
election against Băsescu in a moment of political weakness.125
The referendum was held on the 19th of May and the president was confirmed by a 
majority of the voters (77,48%).126 Nevertheless, even if the action of Parliament, with its 
political majority, was widely refused by the electors, the political situation stalled as the 
President had no means to dissolve the Parliament. All the actors, actually, remained in 
charge until the end of their mandates.
The same situation occurred once more in 2012. For a second time Băsescu won the 
presidential elections, but lost his political majority in the two Houses of Parliament. Once 
more, he was accused of committing “high violations of the constitution”. However, this 
time the Constitutional Court was even more ambiguous in its advice and the Parliament 
voted (256 against 114) for the suspension of the President and the call for a new popular 
vote, hoping to obtain a presidential recall.
The referendum took place on the 29 of July 2012, but the structural quorum for the 
recall election was not reached. According to Romania law, the referendum required the 
participation of the majority of the citizens registered in Romania. The Constitutional Court 
had to declare void the referendum even though the YES votes exceeded the NO.127
These Romanian precedents clearly show that the “plebiscitary model” can lead to 
political abuses of the recall procedure. Without appropriate legal or constitutional 
limitations, like as an elevate majority required (the 2/3 or 3/5 of the members of the 
Parliament) an effective and binding juridical control on the motifs for calling the recall 
election, it can be used as a legal instrument in a political fight against a “no more desirable” 
President. In this view, the abuse is simpler as the electors are only passive subjects and the 
parliamentary majority can choose the moment in which they “feel” there are more 
possibilities to obtain the recall.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has tried to explore and explain the fundamental ideas about the popular 
participation trough the means of recall procedures against holders of public offices.
The first of the conclusions of this paper is that a unique recall does not exist and this 
expression can be used only in a very general sense, indicating all those procedures allowing 
the revoking of public officers through the electoral vote. In this sense, the recall is different 
from other revoking procedures as impeachment, confidence votes, or trials in the courts 
because all of them do not prescribe (in any stage of the procedure) the people’s intervention.
125 On this first recall election, see the report of Baldini (2009) 63–78.
126 See the data report by the Central Electoral Office at link 12.
127 For this second case, see the complete record of Bosioc (2013) 268–75.
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Several recall procedures which are structured in very different ways, are detectable in 
history and current times. It has been considered that the recall proposed by the Antifederalist 
writers was made with the intention to use it as a political device to disempower the new 
Federal Congress, mainly the Senate. The progressive roots of the first Californian recall 
procedure of 1903 and of the others, developed in the U.S. during the first half of 20th 
century has also been explored. The analyses conducted by the doctrine underlined a 
common structure for all these North-American procedures, based on the people’s initiative 
and characterized by the idea of the people as the “fountainhead of the sovereignty”, as 
summarized by Zimmerman. 
It has been shown that there were possible connections between the new socialists 
leaders in U.S. and the European socialist writers and activists. The idea of a binding 
mandate for the elected representatives originated in the Rousseau’s thought and found its 
first legal application in the Swiss Abberufungsrecht during the first years of 19th century. 
The Swiss recall procedures as a direct democracy devices were incorporated into some 
constitutions of the German Länder and became sources of inspiration for the new socialist 
parties in the U.S., which evoked the imperative mandate in a political manifesto of 1897. 
During the same period of time, several American scholars studied the Swiss experience of 
direct democracy and proposed analogue models even for the U.S.
A recent application of the progressive model in the Californian case of 2003 has 
shown its weakness mainly a gap in the public regulation of the financial contributions for 
the recall campaigns allowed very rich politicians and interested privates to spent a lot of 
money to obtain unfairly (but legally) an easier collection of the signatures on the recall 
petition and a richer campaign for the recall election.
The other European plebiscitary model has also been studied which shows that there is 
a complete different way to understand the role of the people in these procedures; they are 
more passive elements than active elements. Thus, the founders of the Weimar constitution 
refused to recognize the people as the source of all sovereign powers because in modern 
democracies the supreme power has to be shared between different constitutional organs to 
protect the balance of the entire system. The people are only called to intervene if it is 
absolutely necessary – to resolve or judge hard political controversies between the other 
supreme powers (i.e. the President and the Parliament). So, the people cannot collect 
signatures on their own, calling for the recall election against the public officer, principally 
the President. The decision to call for a popular vote is taken autonomously by an 
authoritative body the Parliament or, in the Latvian case, the President. 
In the progressive model, no authoritative decisions are allowed before the popular 
vote. There is no suspension of the public officer or other sanctions against him before the 
recall election. Here, the organs of the State e.g., the officers charged to control the 
signatures on the petition or the ones competent to call for the recall election, have no 
margins of political appreciation. If the legal requisites are fulfilled, they have to proceed 
and there cannot be any obstacles in the way of the procedure e.g., they cannot refuse to 
call the recall elections if there are all the mandatory requirements. 
There were abuses in both cases analysed and were of a very different kind. The first 
case had an economical exploitation of the recall procedure in California, to avoid the legal 
boundaries on the financial assistance in electoral campaigns. The other case had a strong 
political abuse of the presidential recall in Romania by a parliamentary majority, which 
tried to kick out a President who twice lost his political majority in the two Houses of 
Parliament. Nevertheless, the unifying element in both the cases is that the political actors 
tried to manipulate and exploiting the legal gaps and the lacks in the constitutional 
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regulation, to carry on the recall procedure at a more convenient for them. Using the 
economic possibilities or majority votes in the Parliament (even against the advice of the 
Constitutional Court), the popular vote was used as an instrument for their own purposes. 
In conclusion, these manipulations show the dangerous nature of these procedures and 
highlight that a complete and detailed regulation always matters for a fairly development of 
these procedures. The progressive model implies a special attention to the phase of the 
initiative, in order to avoid that determined subjects can use their economic or social 
position to take procedural advantages. The plebiscitary model also requires juridical 
limitations in the initiative phase, to bound the parliamentary vote for the suspension of the 
President and the call for the popular vote to a larger majority or to a previous decision of 
an independent court. 
Finally, it is capital, in order to provide useful countermeasures, to understand precisely 
who and how have the power to promote the procedure and to decide on its development. 
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